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On January 12, 2021, the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice
(HCJ) will hear arguments in a series of cases challenging the constitutionality of
Israel’s Coronavirus Law. This Law was enacted on July 23, 2020, to replace the
Israeli government’s reliance on general emergency powers. It was supposed to curb
the government’s powers on restricting rights and ensure parliamentary supervision
of enacted measures. In fact, however, it handed the government new executive
lawmaking powers rather than limiting them.
In a state of emergency since the foundation
Upon the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Israeli government relied on two
legal tools for its orders and regulations to contain the virus. The first tool was orders
issued by the Ministry of Health under the 1940 Public Health Ordinance dating back
to the pre-Independence British Mandate. The ordinance, widely used at first, was
eventually deployed mostly for matters of quarantine, isolation, and mask wearing.
The second tool was the Emergency Regulations (ER). Basic Law: The Government
grants the government general authority to issue such regulations during a state of
emergency. But unlike other countries, which had to declare a state of emergency
to deal with the coronavirus crisis, a state of emergency has been ongoing in Israel
since its foundation in 1948. This legal status, annually renewed, authorizes the
government to pass ER for the “protection of the state, public security, and the
existence of essential supply and services”. Between March and June 2020, the
Israeli government issued more than one-hundred ERs, the highest yearly number
ever. This was a transitional period, following the general elections held on March
2, 2020, and before the convention of the new Knesset. In fact, this was a caretaker
government after three inconclusive election rounds that began in April 2019 and
during an ongoing constitutional crisis (see analysis here and here). A fourth election
round is scheduled for March 21, 2021.
In April 2020, however, Israel’s Attorney-General advised the government that,
whenever possible, it was its legal duty to advance primary legislation in the Knesset
to replace continued recourse to ER. A petition to the HCJ also demanded a stop
to the use of ER, arguing it exceeded the government’s authority grounded in the
ongoing state of emergency. By the time the HCJ ruled on the case though, the
Coronavirus Law had already been enacted and the Court deleted the petition
as moot. However, during the hearings and in its judgment, the HCJ did express
support for the petitioners’ claim and took exception to the continued reliance on ER
to address the Coronavirus crisis.
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Expanding powers
The Coronavirus Law, formally known as Law Granting Government Special
Authorities to Combat Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provision) 2020), empowers
the government to declare a state of emergency due to the coronavirus if it holds
there is an actual risk of the virus spreading and a threat to public health. The
government is allowed to enact temporary regulations to prevent contagion, to
minimize the spread and scope of the disease, or to protect the population at risk.
Thus, while the first national lockdown of March 2020 was legally anchored in ER,
the subsequent lockdowns of September 2020 and December 2020 were legally
anchored in regulations issued under the new Coronavirus Law. Although the
Coronavirus Law accorded the government new legislative and regulatory powers,
the government in September 2020 enacted Amendment No 2 to the Law when it
found it lacked powers it considered necessary.
Purportedly replacing recourse to ER with primary legislation, this law in fact
provides the government a new source for making regulations strikingly similar to
those issued as ER. On the one hand, and unlike ER, regulations issued under the
Coronavirus Law cannot change, suspend, or put conditions on existing primary
legislation and, again unlike ER, it has a closed list of measures. Yet, regulations
issued under the Coronavirus Law reflect the measures already in force, adopted
in March-June 2020. These include restrictions on activity in the public and private
spheres, restrictions on activity in workplaces and businesses, restrictions on
gatherings and events, on education, welfare and transportation activities, and
several cases of cordon sanitaire.
Regarding the content of the regulations, ER measures give the government more
discretion than the Coronavirus Law, which is limited to specific emergencies related
to the Coronavirus. Moreover, the government can implement the regulations
according to the Coronavirus Law only after considering alternative ways of
reaching the same aims, the potential infringement of rights, and the effects on
the economy. In the Coronavirus Law, however, the authority to declare a state of
emergency is given to the government, whereas a general state of emergency must
be declared and renewed by the Knesset. Indeed, the government can extend (and
has extended) the state of emergency due to the Coronavirus even through a vote
conducted over the phone. Furthermore, whereas ER provisions can be valid for
three months, the Coronavirus Law restricts the duration of the regulations to seven,
fourteen, or twenty-eight days but allows for their extension after approval by the
relevant Knesset committee.
Although the Coronavirus Law seemingly narrows the powers of the government
vis-à-vis those it enjoys under the general ER authority, the enactment of the
Law enabled the government to expand its authority. In particular, Amendment
No 2 to the Law allows the declaration of a “special state of emergency due to
the Coronavirus” within the current Coronavirus’ state of emergency. The most
significant change introduced by this amendment was to grant authority to the
government during the “special emergency” to restrict demonstrations – an authority
it exercised on October 1, 2020, that was in force until the “special emergency”
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expired on October 13. (On different layers of emergency and the restrictions
on demonstrations, see here). The Coronavirus Law and the regulations issued
under it had previously exempted demonstrations from the lockdown. As it stated
regarding outings to purchase food, medicines, and other essential needs, the
Law allowed attending demonstrations even when severe restrictions on leaving
home were in force. Lockdown rules at that time allowed leaving home without a
specific purpose no further than a thousand meters and, beyond it, only for one
of the enumerated purposes. The amendment and the regulations that followed it
determined that attending demonstrations would be allowed only within the thousand
meters perimeter rather than without restrictions on distance as had been the case
before.
Creating room for abuse
When it was not clear whether it would be possible to legislate this amendment
before the beginning of the second lockdown imposed in September 2020, the
government considered reverting to ER to restrict demonstrations. The Attorney
General objected to such use and the Law was eventually amended in the Knesset.
This development illustrates the risk of the government using the powers newly
awarded to it under the Coronavirus Law to silence political dissent. Many viewed
this amendment as targeting the weekly demonstrations against Prime Minister
Netanyahu, protesting his continued term in office pending corruption indictments
as well as his handling of the Coronavirus crisis. The amendment illustrates how the
Coronavirus Law might become an independent source for the restriction of rights,
even when the Law was interpreted as precluding the option of using ER to restrict
demonstrations under the general state of emergency.
The Coronavirus Law had aimed to replace the excessive use of ER by conferring
authority on the government, within primary legislation, to issue regulations to
combat the coronavirus. It ended up creating a new source of government authority
to make regulations. The demand to act through the legislature by way of primary
legislation rather than through ER issued by the executive has, paradoxically,
handed back powers to the executive. Given the conditions during a pandemic and
the need for changing regulations following changes on the ground, demands to
create new primary legislation were doomed from the start. The demand was rooted
in a concern for democracy and the separation of powers, fearing the concentration
of force in the executive’s hands. It ended up creating new concerns and deepening
those that had led to the new legislation, a reason for alarm given the attempts of
Prime Minister Netanyahu in recent years to consolidate executive power.
 Note that the new Coronavirus Law created mechanisms of parliamentary
supervision over the regulations issued under it, but their effectiveness is limited: For
one, regulations go into force once decreed by the government unless struck down
by Knesset committees but the latter are only afforded twenty-four hours to approve
or reject them. While this oversight mechanism is more significant than the one
that exists in regard to ER, twenty-four hours do not allow for in-depth discussion.
Since the Coronavirus Law came into force, Knesset committees have rarely
rejected regulations. Another reason for the Knesset committees’ weakness when
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scrutinizing governmental regulations is the decision to split parliamentary oversight
between four different committees while excluding the Special Coronavirus Knesset
Committee. This decision was intended to erode the latter’s power to scrutinize
government regulations after it had previously rejected several government orders.
Nevertheless, and despite the splitting, the Knesset Committee on Education,
Culture and Sports has more than once reversed government decisions regarding
education policy and, only recently, decided to reject the closure of grades 5-10
in Israelis schools. And yet, while the Coronavirus Law has created supposedly
superior parliamentary oversight mechanisms, the majority that the government
enjoys in the Knesset usually enables it to control the process and overcome the
opposition.
Enacting a better law
A better Coronavirus Law could have been proposed, giving more powers
to the legislature and less to the executive and creating better parliamentary
supervision, as argued in the petitions against the Law. The HCJ could strike down
the Coronavirus Law entirely, parts of it and/or regulations issued under it. The
demonstrations clause seems particularly susceptible to judicial scrutiny. However,
when addressing it, the HCJ may decide that, since the “special emergency” regime
that allowed these restrictions to operate has expired and was not renewed, the
demonstrations issue is now moot, at least for the time being, and does not warrant
a HCJ holding. So far, the HCJ has generally been reluctant to intervene in the
government’s choice of measures aimed at containing the spread of COVID-19,
and may certainly choose to show the same deference when addressing the current
petitions.
In any event, while a better Coronavirus Law could indeed have been devised,
the paradox we identified might actually be a built-in feature of the demand for
primary legislation granting the government special emergency powers to act within
a pandemic. It would thus be a better alternative to legislate a new Public Health
Law that will include measures required for dealing with pandemics while specifying
the scope of the government’s authority and parliamentary supervision. The current
Public Health Ordinance includes no parliamentary supervision and, as noted, its
use during the COVID-19 outbreak was restricted to a limited set of issues. Other
matters were first addressed through the general emergency powers and later by the
ad-hoc enactment of the Coronavirus Law. A new Public Health Law should address
pandemics as part of an holistic understanding of public health, human rights, and
democracy.
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